Idaho Appeals Court Child Custody where magistrate relied on evidence too early to be relevant in determining “best interest” of the child.
Erin P. Roeh v Robert P. Roeh 746 P.2d 1016 (1987)
FACTS
Erin Roeh was previously married from March of 1978 until her divorce in June of 1981. She and Robert Roeh were married in January of 1982. On December 18, 1983, they had a daughter, Faith. Almost one year later, on November 13, 1984, Erin filed for divorce from Robert. After a three-day trial, ending on May 10, 1985, the magistrate concluded the marriage should be dissolved and he took under advisement the question of custody of the child. Several months later, on October 22, 1985, counsel for both parties met with the trial judge in chambers. At that meeting the magistrate orally announced his decision to award joint legal custody with primary physical custody of the minor child to Mr. Roeh. The court directed Mr. Roeh's counsel to prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those counsel-drafted findings, conclusions and judgment were adopted verbatim by the trial court and entered on January 6, 1986. As entered, the magistrate's findings and conclusions determined that "joint legal custody," with "primary physical custody" in Mr. Roeh, should be awarded. Erin appealed to the district court. The district court set aside the lower court's custody decision and remanded the case for the introduction of new evidence. The district court ruled that the findings prepared by Mr. Roeh's counsel assigned excessive weight to "irrelevant" evidence of past behavior presented at trial rather than focusing upon matters that would demonstrate present parental fitness and the current parent-child relationship. Mr. Roeh then appealed.
ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in deciding the custody by considering improper factors in making its determination, by failing to consider statutorily mandated factors, and by assigning too much weight to some factors while ignoring others?
RULE
The courts looked to the case Craig v McBride, 639 P.2d 303 (1982). The courts said “We cannot countenance the court’s reference to the mother’s sexual conduct. Whether intended as condemnatory of the mother’s sexual conduct or only as indicative of the mother’s unstable life style, our concern is that the mother’s bearing of children out of wedlock or her instability in terms of relationships should be determinative only were such conduct to adversely affect the child or the mother’s parenting abilities.” The statute gives wide discretion to a judge regarding custody decisions. However, the statute restrictively states: "The court shall consider all relevant factors. ..." I.C. § 32-717 Implicitly, the court must avoid considering irrelevant factors.
HOLDING
Affirmed and remanded.
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